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Ethical Considerations of Blockchain: Do We Need a
Blockchain Code of Conduct?
Courtesy of Michele Benedetto Neitz 
Blockchain technology is not as decentralized as we think. From the outset, the original innovators of blockchain
viewed the technology as an opportunity to solve the “problem” of government oversight over economic activities. A
truly decentralized, immutable ledger, would remove the potential for human shortcomings and state control,
impacting everything from money and health care to supply chain management and electronic voting. 
 But as states begin to adopt regulations governing cryptocurrencies and other uses of blockchain technology, it is
becoming clear that the libertarian ideal of blockchain was just that – an ideal. There are already examples in which
human decision-making has counteracted the immutability of some blockchains. In short, there appears to be a
movement toward centralization within this decentralized technology.  
 This movement has profound consequences. As my recent article examines, whenever human decision-making
processes are in e ect, the possibility of ethical concerns arise. Ironically, it is exactly this type of  awed human
process that blockchain was designed to solve. 
 Are Blockchains Truly Decentralized? 
 Proponents of permissionless blockchains argue that decentralization is critical to the vision of this type of blockchain.
For example, although consensus may ultimately create a centralized viewpoint, Ethereum is intended to be
architecturally decentralized.  However, the Ethereum core developers have an outsized in uence over the decisions
made on the Ethereum blockchain. 
 Two recent examples illustrate the power of these “agents of in uence.” In 2016, the infamous hacker of the DAO on
the Ethereum platform exploited a vulnerability to drain almost a third of the $160 million in Ether raised by the fund.
In response, Ethereum’s seven core developers proposed a hard fork to reverse the transaction and restore the funds.
The majority of Ethereum miners adopted this solution and changed Ethereum’s code, thereby modifying what was
thought to be an immutable blockchain. 
 This extraordinary remedy was created by a small group of people advocating successfully for the hard fork. Nearly
two years later, a developer company named Parity left a bug in its smart contracts on the Ethereum platform. The bug
enabled a user to accidentally take control of hundreds of wallets containing millions of dollars’ worth of Ether. When
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the user tried to return the money by deleting the code that had transferred ownership, he permanently “froze” $300
million worth of Ether. The owners of the frozen currency justi ably pushed for a hard fork in this case, arguing that
this event was similar to the DAO hack. However, Ethereum’s core developers decided against a hard fork in this case,
instead electing to leave the $300 million locked. 
 The hard fork in the DAO case, and the lack of a hard fork in the Parity bug case, are instructive examples of the power
of a small group of people to in uence decisions on a blockchain platform. In the  rst situation, the core developers
in uenced the return of millions of dollars to the proper individuals. In the second situation, the core developers
in uenced the decision to allow millions of dollars to be locked away. Those decisions were made not by math or
algorithms, but through the in uence of a small number of core developers. The human intervention in the process
raises ethical concerns. If the management of public blockchain platforms is so strongly in uenced by a small number
of core persons, we should ask whether they will bring their biases and con icts of interest to the blockchain. These
issues are not limited to permissionless blockchains, as demonstrated by permissioned blockchains such as Facebook’s
Libra. 
 Libra’s White Paper, published in June 2019, describes the company’s intent to design and govern Libra’s ecosystem for
the “public good.” Although all consumers would be able to use the currency, Libra’s governance and control is
reserved for those selected by Facebook to be a part of the Libra Association. While the Libra Association intends to
eventually transition to a permissionless blockchain for Libra, that reality is still years away.  
 The Libra Association also prompts an obvious question: who will be part of the Association, and therefore be able to
join the Council and/or the Board to make decisions for the blockchain? Unlike the culture at Ethereum, which is open to
any code developer, membership in the Libra Association requires an elite set of credentials. Libra’s developers argued
that limiting Founding Member status to organizations with established reputations makes it less likely that those
members would act maliciously.  However, one need not look too far to  nd “established” companies embroiled in
corporate scandals. How can we know whether Libra’s Founding Members su er from biases or con icts of interest
that will a ect the blockchain, including the hot topic of whether Facebook will truly refrain from connecting spending
power with identity data?  
 It is di cult to reconcile the power of the Libra Association’s elite Founding Members with their goal of a
“decentralized” blockchain. In the face of global criticism, more than half a dozen Founding Members have left the Libra
Association in the last few months. Regulators worldwide have threatened to ban the currency until Facebook
addresses regulatory concerns. With the success of Libra hanging in the balance, Facebook and the Libra Association
should recognize the need for ethical standards as it develops this new currency. 
 The Ethical Concerns of Centralization and the Path Forward 
 Ethical issues can occur whenever humans are involved in decision-making. This is the reason that many professions—
such as law, medicine, and accounting—create ethical standards of conduct. Blockchain technology, though still a new
 eld, has the potential to be as impactful upon people’s lives as these established  elds. For example, if Libra succeeds,
it will potentially touch the lives of billions of people around the world. Accordingly, it is time to have the debate over
the issues raised by human-in uenced decisions in blockchain platforms.  
 When biases a ect the decision-making processes of individuals in positions of power, the consequences can harm all
of society. Although explicit bias may be easy to identify, it is harder to recognize the implicit biases that all persons
possess. These biases especially impact snap decisions made quickly without much forethought. The human agents in a
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blockchain platform, such as the Ethereum core developers or the members of the Libra Association, may also have
biases. For instance, if they hold implicit biases against a certain group, these biases may result in members giving more
weight to member suggestions than non-member suggestions. 
 The same is true for con icts of interest— there is simply no way to know whether the people in uencing the code
design underlying permissioned and permissionless blockchains truly have the best interest of the users at heart. This is
an acute problem for Facebook’s Libra, given Facebook’s checkered history when it comes to protecting users’ data. 
 It therefore makes sense to consider the creation of an ethical code of conduct for agents of in uence in the
blockchain space. Numerous states are moving quickly to develop regulations to govern blockchain technology, and it is
worth debating whether these regulations should include ethical codes of conduct. Indeed, some blockchain
technologists, including Ethereum engineers, are not waiting for government regulation and are actually creating their
own codes of conduct. 
 There will certainly be challenges to implementing a blockchain code of conduct. Some would argue that there is no
need to have a code of conduct for permissionless blockchains, since currency miners could just walk away if they do
not like what is happening on a particular chain. Moreover, given the libertarian origins of blockchain, there would likely
be a strong backlash. Blockchain developers who embrace the libertarian ideal will argue that implementation of a
common standard goes against the very freedoms that make blockchain a revolutionary technology.    
There are also issues of e ective enforcement of ethical standards in this new  eld. For example, will developers lose
their place of in uence if they act in a biased manner or have con icts of interest? How would the Libra Association
handle a founding member with a con ict of interest? Jurisdictional challenges also exist, since blockchains are global
and one country or state’s laws will not apply universally. 
 These challenges are not insurmountable, and we could look to other professions to  nd the path forward. But at a
minimum, it is time for us to debate the need for ethical rules tailored to this new technology.  
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